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main board (FTSE350) rather than the junior market (AIM) attract more analyst coverage than can be explained
by existing factors, evenwhen we control for listing requirements and the type of cross-listing. We also find that
listing requirements have a significantly greater impact on the number of analysts followingAIMcompanies rath-
er than their FTSE350 counterparts. Moreover, pooling stocks from different listing locations can conceal addi-
tional differences in the determinates of analyst services for the main board and junior markets. For example,
cross-listing on a stock exchange increases analysts coverage for FTSE350 stocks but not AIM stocks and listing
on less transparent trading venues such as over the counter and alternative trading systems (dark pools)
decreases analyst coverage, especially for AIM stocks.
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It is crucial for managers to understandwhat influences analyst cov-
erage since it is well documented that analyst coverage affects firm
value. For example, Doukas, McKnigh, and Pantzalis (2005) and Jung,
Sun, and Yang (2012) suggest that financial analysts facilitate more ef-
fective monitoring of the firms' activities, thereby reducing agency
costs and increasing share value. Moreover, Baik, Kang, and Morton
(2010) and Gotti, Han, Higgs, and Kang (2012) show that more analysts
following increases firm value and reduces audit fees. In addition, Lang,
Lins, and Maffett (2012) document higher liquidity and lower transac-
tion costs when the number of analysts following a firm is higher. Li
and You (2015) find that analysts create value for the firms they cover
by increasing the demand for their common shares rather than moni-
toring or reducing information asymmetry.
Evidently, analyst coverage adds value to firms by signalling
information about their performance and by increasing their visibility
to investors, even when they do not actively add new information
about these firms, but simply use existing information (Mola, Rau, &
Khorana, 2013). Therefore, analyst coverage is actively pursued byn), frank.skinner@brunel.ac.uk
. This is an open access article underfirms. For example, Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) provide evidence
that managers value analyst coverage and are willing to expend re-
sources to maintain a certain level of that coverage while Cliff and
Denis (2004) find that firms are willing to compensate for analyst cov-
erage through initial public offering premiums. Bushee and Miller
(2012) note that some firmsmay resort to hiring investor relations pro-
fessionals in order to pitch their business to security analysts while Kirk
(2011) states that firms are prepared to buy research. Sibilkov, Straska,
and Waller (2013) find that firms value analyst coverage and are
prepared to strategically use the choice of merger and acquisition advi-
sors to secure analyst coverage. Unsurprisingly, prior studies have tried
to explore factors that drive analyst coverage, but mainly for the US
market.
Our contribution is to highlight the influence of the marketplace for
a company's shares on analyst coverage. Specifically, we examine
the impact of three related aspects of listings on capital markets on an-
alyst coverage. First, we examine whether listing on the main board
(FTSE350) as opposed to the junior market (AIM) impacts the number
of analysts following a stock. Second, we investigate whether the type
of cross-listing such as listing on a stock exchange (SE), over the counter
market (OTC) and alternative trading system (ATS) or “dark pools” is
related to analyst coverage. Third, we examine whether listing require-
ments affects the number of analysts following a stock.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 When dealers can see the full order book they can see the price and the quantity at all
levels of the bid and ask. That is, the dealers can see the supply and demand curves for the
shares.
2 See http://www.world-stock-exchanges.net/.
228 O.A.G. Hassan, F.S. Skinner / International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016) 227–236Bhushan (1989) introduces a simple model where he suggests a
number offirm characteristics that can impact analyst coverage. Follow-
ing Bhushan (1989), subsequent empirical studies investigate the
determinants of analyst coverage at both the country and firm levels.
Multi-country studies examine the impact of different institutional en-
vironments on analyst coverage, such as investor protection, corporate
governance (e.g., Baik et al., 2010; Boubakri & Bouslimi, 2010;
Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004; Yu,
2010), and the effect of varying accounting standards for cross-listed
stocks (e.g., Abdallah, Abdallah, & Ismail, 2012; Chen, Weiss, & Zheng,
2007). In firm-level studies, scholars examine the impact of different
company characteristics and corporate governance issues on analyst
following (e.g., Baik et al., 2010; Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001;
Bhushan, 1989; Brennan & Hughes, 1991; Eng, Nabar, & Mian, 2008;
Jiraporn, Chintrakarn, & Kim, 2012; Jiraporn, Liu, & Kim, 2014; Lang &
Lundholm, 1996; Lehavy, Li, & Merkley, 2011; Marston, 1997; Rajan &
Servaes, 1997; Sabherwal & Smith, 2008).
In the UK context, Marston (1997) examines Bhushan's model for a
sample of 251 firms listed on the main board in 1991. However, due to
the unavailability of similar data on the main proxies (i.e., the number
of analysts following, institutional holdings and insiders' holdings) to
those employed in Bhushan (1989), Marston recommends repeating
the study using all UK quoted companies to further examine the validity
of Bhushan's model in the UK context. Hussain (2000) examines analyst
coverage of theUKFTSE companies using a simultaneous equation frame-
work to address the potential endogeneity problem between the number
of analysts following and institutional ownership. However, the focus of
these two studies is largerUK companies quoted on themainboard sode-
terminates of analysts following smaller and junior listed companies have
not been previously investigated. In addition, both Hussain (2000) and
Marston (1997) employ a classical linear regression model that does
not suit datasets where the dependent variable (the number of analysts
following a firm) is a discrete variable that takes only a finite number of
nonnegative integers (Rock, Sedo, & Willenborg, 2001).
A review of prior studies shows more gaps in the current literature,
which provides furthermotivation for this study. Firstly, the literature is
mainly informed by US studies. This study covers the UKmarket, which
is structurally different from the US market in an important aspect that
is relevant to the demand for analyst services. Specifically, only 10.7% of
listed equity in the UK is owned by individuals (Office of National
Statistics, 2012), whereas the comparable figure for the US is 36.5%
(US Census, 2012). This implies a higher concentration of institutional
holdings in the UK as opposed to the US (ICAEW, 2007). This is impor-
tant because the number of institutions and the percentage ownership
held by institutions has been shown to be important determinants of
the demand for analyst services in prior studies.
Secondly, although the sample constituents covered in prior studies
sometimes belong to different listing locations (mainmarket versus junior
market); none has examined the possibility that the determinants of ana-
lyst coverage can be conditional on listing location. For instance, while
Brennan and Hughes (1991), Chen et al. (2007) and Jiraporn et al.
(2012) include main board NYSE/AMEX and junior market NASDAQ
firms in their sample and Giraldo (2011) include stocks traded on six dif-
ferent trading venues including NYSE, NASDAQ and OTC, they do not ex-
amine whether the determinates of analyst services differ by listing
location. Meanwhile, Baik et al. (2010), Jiraporn et al. (2014) and Rajan
and Servaes (1997) include listed and non-listed firms in their sample
and add a dummy for listing versus non-listed firms. This is a different
issue than listing on themainboard as opposed to the juniormarket partly
because thehurdle frommoving to themainboard fromthe juniormarket
is much lower than issuing an initial public offering. Moreover, we divert
from prior studies by explicitly examining the impact of different listing
requirements for listing on the main board as opposed to the junior mar-
ket on analyst coverage. These includemarket capitalisation and freefloat.
Thirdly, unlike prior studies, we examine the effect of cross-listings
on stock exchanges, over the counter markets and alternative tradingsystems on analyst coverage. The salient difference among the three
types of trading venues is transparency where stock exchanges allow
dealers to see the full order book1 whereas over the counter and espe-
cially alternative trading systems (dark pools) provide much less infor-
mation on the demand and supply of shares. The potential impact of
these different trading systems is especially important given the rise
of alternative trading systems and the development of the London
Stock Exchange to what is now popularly known as theworld's premier
international stock exchange.2
The current study examines the impact of listing location on analyst
coverage using count data panel regressions that adjust for the count
nature of the dependent variable as do Boubaker and Labégorre
(2008) and Rock et al. (2001), but for more recent, non-US panel data.
We employ count panel regression methods for a sample of 1194 UK
listed companies from 2010 to 2015. The use of panel data provides a
number of advantages over both the traditional cross-sectional and
time-series analyses. It gives the researcher a larger number of observa-
tions, thus increasing the degrees of freedom for any statistical testing
and lessening the problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory
variables (Hsiao, 2002), thereby improving the efficiency of estimates.
We first include a dummy variable for the listing location to see if
there is something special about being listed on the main board. We
find that the location dummy is positive and highly significant. More-
over, it is clear that cross-listing on stock exchanges is positive but
cross-listings on less transparent over the counter and alternative trad-
ing systems are inversely related to analyst coverage.
This means that stocks listed on themain board attract more analyst
coverage than can be explained by existing factors. The question now is
whether the listing requirements can explain this? To answer this ques-
tion, we separately investigate how additionally controlling for differ-
ences in market capitalisation and free float changes the coefficient on
the listing location dummy variable. We also conduct this examination
for themain and juniormarkets individually to examinewhether stocks
from the main board and the junior market can be pooled together in
the same dataset. In other words, we investigate whether the demand
and supply functions for analyst services are the same for the main
board and junior market stocks.
We find thatmarket capitalisation positively impacts analyst coverage
and that impact is significantly higher for theAIMcompanies.We alsofind
that free float has a positive impact on the total and the AIM samples yet
free float is inversely related to the number of analysts following for the
FTSE350 sample. The difference in the impact of free float between the
twomarkets is statistically significant. Together, the significant difference
in the influence of market capitalisation and free float between the main
board and the junior market hint that the demand and supply of analyst's
services do vary by listing location so caution is advisablewhen suggesting
which factors for analyst services are operative for pooled samples ofmain
board and junior market stocks. Still, even when controlling for market
capitalisation, free float and type of cross-listing, listing on the main
board as opposed to the junior market has a significant positive influence
on the number of analysts following a company.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
develop our hypotheses. The model is presented in Section 3 while
Section 4 describes the sample and discusses the results. Section 5 pro-
vides concluding remarks.
2. Hypothesis development
Individuals hold a larger portion of AIM companies thanmain board
listed companies due to holdings by directors (Office of National
Statistics, 2012). Accordingly, we expect that ownership dispersion is
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Clatworthy and Peel (2007) suggest that the likelihood of information
asymmetry and agency problems on the main market is higher than
that on the AIM market due to greater ownership dispersion of
FTSE350 companies. As the level of information asymmetry and agency
problems among the management of the firm and outside providers of
funds increases, the demand for analyst services will increase. There-
fore, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1. Analyst coverage is expected to be positively associated with listing on
the main board.
Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are subject to dif-
ferent eligibility rules depending on whether the company is listed on
the main market (FTSE350) or on the junior market (AIM). Specifically,
to be listed on the main market, a company must have at least £700k in
market capitalisation, a three-year trading record and at least 25% of its
shares must be in public hands (free float).3 In contrast, AIM companies
have no requirements for a minimum market capitalisation or a mini-
mum percentage of free float. Recent market statistics (London Stock
Exchange Group, 2014a, 2014b) show that FTSE350 listed companies
have a much larger capitalisation than AIM companies because about
87% of FTSE companies have a market value greater than two billion
pounds, whereas only 11.7% of the AIM companies have a market
capitalisation of one billion pounds or more.
Free float is the number of shares that is available to the public rela-
tive to the number of shares outstanding. The number of shares available
to the public is calculated by subtracting the shares held by insiders and
those deemed to be stagnant shareholders from the shares outstanding.4
A higher percentage of the free float means more active stocks will be
available to the public, thereby increasing investors' base. A larger inves-
tor base will imply more transactions business to attract more analyst
coverage. Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2. Companies with higher market capitalisation and higher percentages
of free float are expected to attract more analyst coverage.
3. Research model
Bhushan (1989) suggests that the equilibrium total expenditure by
investors on analyst services for a particular firm in a given period is a
function of various firm characteristics that can either affect the aggre-
gate demand for or supply of analyst services or both. He assumes that
both the aggregate demand and supply functions are continuous and
twice differentiable in all their arguments. He also assumes that the de-
mand curve is downward sloping and the supply curve is upward slop-
ing, thus:
TC  k1; k2;…;knð Þ ¼ P  k1;k2;…;knð ÞQ  k1; k2;…; knð Þ ð1Þ
In (1), TC* is the equilibrium total expenditure by investors on ana-
lyst services for a particular firm in a given period, Q* is the correspond-
ing equilibrium of the aggregated demand for analyst services for the
firm during this period, P* is the equilibrium price and k1, k2, …,kn
are the n company characteristics k. Using comparative statics,
Bhushan (1989) deduced that the effect of any firm characteristic k on3 Moreover, main market firms are required, but AIM listed firms are not required, to
adhere to the UK Corporate Governance Code. Unfortunately, we were unable to collect
much data for AIM firms as AIM companies typically do not file information concerning
governance. We did collect what was available for FTSE and AIM companies and find that
the sample is severely depleted (with only 122 AIM firm-year observations) and the com-
pliance variable was never statistically significant. This is likely becausemost FTSE compa-
nies have a high degree of code compliance, so there is little variation in the data. In any
event, even when we include the compliance variable, our empirical results are not mate-
rially different from what are reported here.
4 Stagnate shareholders include employee benefit trusts, corporations that are not ac-
tively managing money, venture capital companies and governments.the equilibrium total expenditure by investors on analyst services de-
pends on the respective price elasticity of aggregate demand and sup-
ply. A change in a firm characteristic k can result in a shift in either
the demand curve or the supply curve or both. Bhushan (1989) assumes
that the aggregate demand for analyst services is elastic given that the
demand for securities is highly elastic. This, in turn, means that if the
price of analyst services for a particular firm increases slightly, then in-
vestors can change their investment portfolios, replacing a securitywith
other close substitutes that have less expensive analyst services.
Bhushan (1989) considers a number of company characteristics that
can affect either the demand for or the supply of analyst services or
both. These firm characteristics are: ownership structure, firm size,
returns variability, the number of lines of business and the correlation
between firm return and market return. In addition, Bhushan (1989)
considers the effect of industry type in his model.
Hussain (2000) suggests that the number of analysts following and
the percentage of shares owned by institutions can be endogenous be-
cause the percentage ownership by institutions is also inversely related
to another independent variable, i.e. the percentage ownership by in-
siders. However, Hussain (2000) did not specifically examine whether
endogeneity is an empirical issue.Meanwhile, Baik et al. (2010) observe
that firm size and the number of analysts following can be simulta-
neously determined because analyst coverage can lead to higher valua-
tions and analysts are more likely to follow firms with higher values.
Baik et al. (2010) also did not specifically test for endogeneity but
noted that endogeneity is not likely to be a problem because OLS esti-
mateswere similar to their simultaneous equation estimates. Therefore,
we are motivated to test for possible endogeneity between the number
of analysts following and institutional ownership on the one hand, and
the number of analysts following and firm size, on the other hand, using
a Hausman (1978) specification test. We find that the Hausman derived
fitted values for institutional ownership and theHausmanderived fitted
values for firm size are not significantly related to the number of ana-
lysts following in the corresponding structural equation. Therefore,
like Baik et al. (2010), we conclude that endogeneity is not an issue so
that a separate equation for the percentage ownership by institutions
or for market value is not appropriate.5
Therefore, we proceed with Bhushan's (1989) model and include
two proxies for institutional ownership, the number of institutions
holding shares in a company (NINST) and thepercentage of institutional
holdings (%INST). Institutional ownership is expected to affect both the
demand for and the supply of analyst services, but the direction of its ef-
fect is not obvious (Bhushan, 1989). If acquiring analyst service is not
cost effective for individual investors, more concentrated institutional
ownership may imply an increase in the demand for analyst services.
However, more concentrated institutional ownership may increase
the demand for in-house monitoring rather than outside monitoring
via external analyst services.Meanwhile, %INSID is the percentage of in-
siders holding. Assuming that the demand for analyst services comes
mainly from outside providers of funds, and assuming that concentra-
tions in insiders' ownership do not induce agency conflicts among ma-
jority and minority shareholders, an increase in insiders' ownership
implies a decrease in demand for analyst services (Bhushan, 1989). In
addition,we include stock price volatility (VOL) because if analyst infor-
mation and public information are more useful in predicting future re-
turn than public information alone, then higher return variability is
expected to increase the demand for analyst services. Thus, Bhushan
(1989) expects the aggregate demand for analyst services to be an in-
creasing function of a firm's return variability, assuming that the cost
of information acquisition for firms with higher return variability is
not significant. Moreover, the number of segments (NSEG) is used to
proxy for the number of lines of business.We expect that as the number
of business segments increase, the number of analysts following will5 See Brooks (2002) pages 328–330. The details of theseHausmanendogeneity tests are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
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costly to follow.
We also extend Bhushan's (1989) model to include additional firm
characteristics recommended by later studies. First, we introduce a var-
iable (NLISTING) to control for the number of cross-listing since it was
suggested by Marston (1997) that it affects analyst coverage for UK
companies. There are two competing possible effects for cross-listing.
First, cross-listing in foreign exchanges can increase firm visibility and
remove barriers for foreign investors to invest in the company, thereby
widening investors' base and increasing the demand for analyst services
(Marston, 1997). Second, cross-listing in foreign exchanges implies an
increased level of operating activities in the international product mar-
kets making these firms more opaque for analysts. This, in turn, means
that analysts will find it harder to produce forecasts about these firms,
which can discourage some analysts from following them, resulting in
a decrease in the number of analysts following (Eng et al., 2008, p.30).
Therefore, the sign of the relationship between NLISTING and NANAL
is an empirical issue.
We also suggest that the type of cross-listing itself can affect the de-
mand for analyst services. Stock markets are transparent where all
dealers can see the order book, the price and quantity details of the sup-
ply and demand of shares, in real time. Similarly, in over the counter
markets, at least subsets of the dealers can see a portion of the order
book. However, in recent years, we have seen the rise in popularity of
alternative trading systems (dark pools) that allows investors to trade
off the traditional markets so that the trade itself is less likely to move
prices. Only after the trade has been executedwill the trade be reported
to the relevant authorities. The impact of dark pools and over the coun-
termarkets on thedemand for analysts' services is uncertain. On theone
hand, it is possible that investors can feel that the price of stocks that
often trade in less transparent markets is less fair and be less willing
to invest in them and engage analyst services. On the other hand, alter-
native trading systems and over the countermarkets increase the num-
ber of venues for the sale of shares and so could attract additional
analysts coverage. Therefore, we separately examine the impact of
stock exchange, over the countermarket and alternative trading system
cross-listings on analyst coverage.
We also consider three more variables that might affect analyst cov-
erage, namely: firm profitability, systematic risk and audit firm size. We
examine the impact of firm profitability on analyst coverage since prior
studies suggest that analysts will be reluctant to follow non-profitable
companies (e.g., Baik et al., 2010; Boubaker & Labégorre, 2008;
Jiraporn et al., 2014). Firm profitability is measured by return on equity
(ROE). We also examine the impact of systematic risk on analyst cover-
age and use themarket beta (BETA) to proxy for a firm's systematic risk.Table 1
List of variables.
This table reports the definition of the independent variables and the expected sign of the rela
Variable
Expected
sign Description
NINST +/− The number of Institutional stock holders
%INST +/− The percentage of outstanding shares held
%INSID − The percentage of outstanding shares held
VOL + The standard deviation of the relative pric
NSEG − The number of recorded business segment
NLISTING +/− The number of cross-listing
SE +/− The number of cross-listings on traditiona
OTC +/− The number of over the counter cross-listi
ATS +/− The number of cross-listings on alternative
multi-trading facility MTF, crossing netwo
BIG4 + A dummy variable that takes the value of o
BETA + The market model beta for each stock mea
ROE + Return on Equity in percentage, calculated
MCAP + The market value of equity of the firm at th
TA + Total assets
Float + The percentage of shares that is available t
Industry dummies +/− A dummy variable that takes the value of 1A firm's systematic risk may impact analyst activity through the institu-
tional clientele effectwhich in turn could affect afirm's disclosure policy
(Baik et al., 2010; Boubaker & Labégorre, 2008; Hussain, 2000). There-
fore, we expect a positive association between market beta and analyst
coverage for UK listed companies.
Audit firm size (BIG4) is often used in prior studies as a surrogate for
audit quality (e.g., Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang, 2011; Tendeloo &
Vanstraelen, 2008). This line of research can be interpreted as either
large auditors provide higher quality audits as they have more wealth
and reputational risk (DeAngelo, 1981; Ireland, 2003), or that small au-
ditors supply low levels of audit quality (DeFond & Francis, 2005).
Smaller accounting firms report less conservatively as they issue fewer
non-clean audit reports and their clients are more likely to have abnor-
mal accruals, which is suggestive of more aggressive earnings manage-
ment. Credible financial reporting and high-quality earnings may
reduce the costs of collecting and analysing public financial disclosures
and may help financial analysts produce better forecasts, attracting
more clients, which will increase the demand for analyst services.
BIG4 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the auditor is
one of the four dominant accounting firms and zero otherwise. There-
fore, our initial model is as follows.
NANALit ¼ b0 þ b1 Ln 1þ NINSTitð Þ þ b2 Ln 1þ%INSTitð Þ
þ b3 Ln 1þ%INSIDitð Þ þ b4 VOLit þ b5 Ln 1þ NSEGitð Þ
þ b6 Ln NLISTINGitð Þ þ b7 BIG4it þ b8 BETAit þ b9 ROEit
þ b10 MRTit þ b11 Ln TAitð Þ þ b12 Industry dummyit
þ εit ð2Þ
The detailed description and the expected sign of all the dependent
variables are summarised in Table 1.
We test our hypotheses by firstly introducing a dummy variable
(MRT) that takes the value of one for listing on the main board
(FTSE350), and zero otherwise, to examine the effect of the listing loca-
tion on analyst coverage for the total sample. In addition, we run the
same regression for the FTSE350 and AIMmarkets individually. Second-
ly, we consecutively replace the total number of cross-listings
(NLISTING)with the number of cross-listings on SE, OTC andATS to sep-
arately examine the impact of changes in the transparency of the trad-
ing venue on analyst coverage overall and on the main board and
junior markets separately. Thirdly, we replace total assets (TA) with
market capitalisation (MCAP) to determine whether it is firm size as
measured by total assets or firm size as determined by the listing re-
quirement that influences the number of analysts following. Finally,
we introduce free float (FLOAT) to check the impact on the dummy var-
iable for listing location (MRT) to determine, along with markettionship with NANAL, number of analysts making recommendations for a stock.
by institutional investors
by insiders
e change for the 360 calendar days closing price, expressed as a percentage
s
l stock exchanges
ngs
trading systems (dark pools) including electronic communication networks (ECNs),
rks and call markets.
ne if the auditor is one of the four dominant accounting firms and zero otherwise.
sured via the market model using weekly data.
as (net income available for common shareholders / average total common equity)
e fiscal year-end
o the public
for the relevant industry and 0 otherwise.
Table 2A
Descriptive analysis.
This table reports the sample statistics for the combined, FTSE350 and AIM listed samples.
Mean Median Max. Min. STD Skewness Kurtosis
Total sample of 3485 firm-year observations
NANAL 7.53 3.00 50.00 0.00 8.90 1.24 3.65
NINST 162.05 87.00 1214.00 0.00 180.50 2.12 8.11
%INST 78.64 88.94 100.00 0.00 25.86 −1.23 3.59
%INSID 14.76 4.17 100.00 0.00 21.86 2.02 6.78
VOL 46.55 35.38 978.63 5.85 45.07 7.53 100.56
NSEG 1.82 1.00 14.00 0.00 1.57 2.26 13.24
NLISTING 23.58 26.00 48.00 0.00 12.53 −0.32 1.97
SE 3.90 3.00 13.00 0.00 2.24 0.87 3.78
OTC 11.03 16.00 20.00 0.00 7.49 −0.38 1.26
ATS 8.65 8.00 18.00 0.00 4.37 −0.35 2.60
BIG4 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 −0.63 1.39
BETA 0.73 0.70 2.86 −0.91 0.36 0.38 4.42
ROE 3.52 8.62 2409.86 −1370.85 73.71 11.90 454.45
MCAP (M £) 2605.92 112.15 124,730.00 0.33 9719.55 6.62 54.48
TA (M £) 12,967.30 112.97 1,690,610.00 0.05 105,145.70 12.27 166.09
FLOAT (%) 74.28 79.23 100.00 0.90 22.34 −0.70 2.49
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count for the influence of listing location.
4. Research sample and results
4.1. Research sample
The data for this study are collected from the Bloomberg database.
Our initial sample consists of all firms listed on the London Stock Ex-
change. The initial sample consists of 1267 UK listed companies from
2010 to 2015 with a maximum 7602 firm-year observations. The actual
sample size depends on the availability of information about each vari-
able included in the regression model, so that we finally end up with
1194 firms with a common sample of 3485 firm-year observations.
This includes 351 FTSE350 companieswith 1403firm-year observations
and 843 AIM companies with 2082 firm-year observations.
4.2. Descriptive analysis
Table 2A provides the descriptive analysis for the entire sample. It
shows that the average number of analysts following a UK listed compa-
ny (NANAL) is eight while the median is three. The percentages of
shares held by institutions (%INST) and insiders (%INSID) for an average
UK listed company are about 79% and 15% respectively. This implies that
the UK listed companies are mostly owned by institutions with 162 in-
stitutions (NINST) on average holding shares in a firm. This observation
is consistent with the Office of National Statistics (2012), which reports
that only 10.7% of all UK shares are held by individual investors.
Additionally, the average UK listed company is cross-listed on 24
trading venues worldwide, 4 of which are stock exchanges. Marston
(1997) reports the average number of cross-listings as 0.47 so clearly
the number of cross-listings has increased dramatically over the years
as the London stock exchange developed into the world's premiere
stock exchange. The average company is listedmore on over the counter
markets (11) than on alternative trading systems (9) and has 2 record-
ed segments with return variability (VOL) of 47%. The difference be-
tween the minimum and the maximum value of each variable reflects
the huge variation in the composition of the sample. For example, the
market capitalisation of the companies included in the sample varies
from £ 0.33 to £ 124,730 million suggesting that companies of radically
different sizes are included in the sample. Moreover, free float ranges
from 0.90% to 100%. This suggests that outliers6 might form a problem.6 We alsowinsorize the dataset in order to reduce the impact of outliers and re-run the
analysis. The qualitative results are similar to those obtained here; thereforewedecided to
use the original data.Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of each variable where
practical.
Table 2B, panels A and B, break down the descriptive statistics into
the FTSE350 and AIM sub-samples respectively. The two samples do
look radically different. We find that AIM firms are much smaller, with
fewer analysts following, fewer institutions holding a smaller owner-
ship stake, fewer business segments, fewer cross-listings of all types,
lower systematic risk, lower profitability, lower free float and fewer
companies that were audited by one of the Big4 accounting firms.
However, insiders' ownership stakes are larger, and AIM firms have
much higher return volatility. In results not tabulated here, we com-
pared the differences in the means for all variables between the
FTSE350 companies and their AIM counterparts and they show signifi-
cant differences for all the variables at the 1% level of significance
(two-tailed test).7 This suggests that these two groups of companies
are significantly different.4.3. The correlation matrix
Table 3 reports the results of Pearson correlation test among the
variables. It shows that the number of analysts following a firm
(NANAL) has a significant association with almost all the explanatory
variables in line with prior expectation except VOL and NSEG. The
correlation table indicates that the number of analysts following is in-
creasing with institutional holdings (NINST; %INST), market segments
(NSEG), foreign stock exchange listings of all types (NLISTING, SE, OTC
and ATS), Big4 auditing (BIG4), systemic risk (BETA), return on
equity (ROE), main market listing (MRT), total assets (TA), market
capitalisation (MCAP) and free float (FLOAT) but decreasing in insiders'
holdings (%INSID) and stock volatility (VOL).
The association betweenNANAL andNSEG is positive and significant
contrary to prior expectations. The results also show a negative and sig-
nificant association between VOL and NANAL. However, these results
only focus on the association between a pair of variables; a multiple re-
gression analysis may yield different conclusions.
The correlation between firm size TA and NINST is positive and sig-
nificant (0.373), indicating that larger firms attract more institutional
holdings. In addition, the correlation between TA and %INSID is negative
and significant (−0.081) indicating that smaller firms are more closely
held by insiders. The correlation between TA and each of NSEG,
NLISTING, SE, OTC, ATS, BIG4, BETA, FLOAT is positive and significant, in-
dicating that larger firms have more segments, are more widely cross-7 These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
Table 2B
Descriptive analysis.
This table splits the sample statistics into the main board FTSE350 listed and junior market AIM listed sub-samples.
Panel A: FTSE350 sample of 1403 firm-year observations
NANAL 16.14 16.00 50.00 0.00 8.02 0.45 2.89
NINST 315.33 244.00 1214.00 11.00 198.91 1.44 5.14
%INST 90.34 100.00 100.00 2.44 16.08 −2.15 7.71
%INSID 5.79 0.66 100.00 0.00 14.98 3.99 20.44
VOL 33.16 28.67 252.55 14.36 20.84 5.48 43.64
NSEG 2.65 2.00 14.00 0.00 1.87 2.00 10.85
NLISTING 33.84 35.00 48.00 0.00 9.29 −2.46 9.26
SE 5.15 5.00 13.00 0.00 2.51 0.37 2.90
OTC 16.31 18.00 20.00 0.00 4.40 −2.93 10.29
ATS 12.37 13.00 17.00 0.00 3.51 −2.61 9.81
BIG4 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.16 −5.91 35.95
BETA 0.96 0.93 2.16 −0.02 0.28 0.60 3.90
ROE 24.22 15.85 2409.86 −172.77 90.91 18.55 429.41
MCAP (M £) 6353.70 1543.47 124,730.00 9.43 14,531.86 4.14 22.43
TA (M £) 32,076.48 1792.30 1,690,610.00 38.54 163,895.10 7.70 66.27
FLOAT(%) 86.13 94.85 100.00 2.07 18.47 −1.64 4.85
Panel B: AIM sample of 2082 firm-year observations
NANAL 1.72 1.00 25.00 0.00 2.33 3.73 24.87
NINST 58.76 56.00 325.00 0.00 37.11 0.96 5.92
%INST 70.75 77.34 100.00 0.00 28.13 −0.79 2.58
%INSID 20.81 11.09 100.00 0.00 23.62 1.56 4.90
VOL 55.58 44.32 978.63 5.85 53.90 6.73 77.12
NSEG 1.26 1.00 6.00 0.00 0.99 1.34 5.64
NLISTING 16.66 15.00 37.00 0.00 9.27 −0.16 2.02
SE 3.06 3.00 7.00 0.00 1.54 0.48 2.73
OTC 7.46 3.00 20.00 0.00 7.02 0.49 1.37
ATS 6.14 7.00 18.00 0.00 2.82 −1.10 4.76
BIG4 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.28 1.08
BETA 0.59 0.54 2.86 −0.91 0.33 0.85 7.21
ROE −10.44 1.81 175.59 −1370.85 55.18 −9.68 196.91
MCAP (M £) 80.39 29.71 3922.60 0.33 194.22 8.69 117.88
TA (M £) 90.18 34.89 7822.20 0.05 353.49 17.03 328.29
FLOAT(%) 66.30 68.73 100.00 0.90 21.15 −0.43 2.38
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of the Big4 accounting firms, have higher systematic risk and are more
in public hands. The correlation between firm size TA and return vari-
ability (VOL) is negative but not significant. Most of these results corre-
spond to the results obtained by Bhushan (1989) and Marston (1997).
Table 3 also shows that there are other significant correlations among
the explanatory variables. However, the use of panel data analysis
should reduce the impact of multicollinearity on the regression results
(Hsiao, 2002). In addition, the reported VIF values suggest that
multicollinearity is not an issue for this study.Table 3
Pearson correlation for the common sample (3485 firm-year observations).
NANAL NINST %INST %INSID VOL NSEG NLISTING S
NANAL 1
NINST .878** 1
%INST .313** .323** 1
%INSID −.332** −.342** −.340** 1
VOL −.233** −.212** −.211** −.039* 1
NSEG .442** .482** .165** −.137** −.190** 1
NLISTING .611** .594** .175** −.238** −.177** .365** 1
SE .659** .695** .159** −.275** −.100** .378** .711** 1
OTC .452** .425** .106** −.178** −.140** .256** .931**
ATS .641** .620** .238** −.236** −.217** .415** .909**
BIG4 .506** .446** .425** −.277** −.195** .288** .386**
BETA .505** .438** .251** −.285** −.003 .210** .365**
ROE .205** .167** .137** .007 −.182** .111** .153**
MCAP .568** .742** .025 −.159** −.118** .371** .347**
TA .302** .373** .008 −.081** −.028 .339** .195**
FLOAT .415** .441** .357** −.555** −.070** .207** .339**
VIF 5.148 1.493 1.571 1.156 1.398 1.706 2
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 l4.4. Multiple regression analysis
The Poisson model is a count data regression model, which corrects
for the discrete, count data nature of our dependent variable and is es-
pecially suitable when the conditional mean and variance of the depen-
dent variable are equal. If the equality of the conditional mean and
variance does not hold, then the standard errors generated by the
Poisson model will be underestimated thereby incorrectly reporting
high levels of significance. In this case, a negative binomial count
(NBC) regression model is more suitable (Rock et al., 2001).E OTC ATS BIG4 BETA ROE MCAP TA FLOAT
.464** 1
.732** .720** 1
.330** .309** .409** 1
.384** .281** .369** .328** 1
.065** .126** .191** .162** .060** 1
.509** .223** .354** .191** .187** .073** 1
.313** .121** .191** .090** .185** .006 .534** 1
.323** .257** .368** .320** .337** .077** .174** .045** 1
.029 1.313 1.844 1.485 1.412 1.077 3.241 1.510 1.720
evel (2-tailed). VIF is the variance inflation factor for each variable.
Table 4
The impact of listing location on analyst coverage.
This table reports the impact of listing location andother control factors on thenumber of analyst coverage forUK listed companies usingNegative Binomial Count (Quadratic hill climbing)
and GLM Robust Standard Errors & Covariance. It considers firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.
Variable Expected sign Total all FTSE350 SE FTSE350 OTC FTSE350 ATS AIM SE AIM OTC AIM ATS
b0 −0.764** −0.201 −0.218 −0.273 −1.213** −0.810** −0.996**
Ln (1 + NINST) +/− 0.347** 0.477** 0.539** 0.532** 0.304** 0.336** 0.329**
Ln (1 + %INST) +/− −0.064** −0.102** −0.126** −0.123** −0.117** −0.167** −0.149**
Ln (1 + %INSID) − 0.012 0.017* 0.018* 0.016* 0.028 0.024 0.027
Ln (VOL) + −0.119** −0.082** −0.076** −0.073** −0.183** −0.184** −0.178**
Ln (1 + NSEG) − −0.140** −0.081** −0.066** −0.070** −0.205** −0.154** −0.174**
Ln (1 + NLISTING) +/− −0.022* 0.159** −0.009 0.020 0.188** −0.048** 0.015
BIG4 + 0.406** 0.280** 0.256** 0.259** 0.211** 0.242** 0.228**
BETA + 0.235** 0.230** 0.248** 0.244** 0.270** 0.284** 0.280**
ROE + 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
MKT + 0.893**
Ln (TA) + 0.136** 0.044** 0.050** 0.051** 0.355** 0.349** 0.357**
CONSUMER__CYCLICAL 0.027 0.075** 0.080** 0.077** −0.045 −0.12 −0.098
CONSUMER__NON_CYCLICAL −0.137** −0.082** −0.062** −0.068** −0.143** −0.157** −0.163**
ENERGY 0.161** 0.053 0.026 0.037 0.196** 0.213** 0.213**
FINANCIAL −0.343** −0.201** −0.202** −0.206** −0.537** −0.577** −0.570**
INDUSTRIAL −0.210** −0.153** −0.157** −0.162** −0.333** −0.373** −0.367**
TECHNOLOGY −0.058 0.091** 0.077 0.087* −0.242** −0.268** −0.266**
UTILITIES −0.293** −0.183** −0.196** −0.194** −1.596** −1.572** −1.627**
N 3224 1412 1412 1412 2107 2107 2107
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.47 0.46 0.46
Log likelihood −7013.55 −4177.42 −4203.84 −4202.95 −3186.35 −3191.64 −3194.02
**, *. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed) respectively. Ln: the natural logarithm.
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the questionwhether listing on themain board as opposed to the junior
market impacts the number of analysts following a stock? We run the
more conservative negative binomial count data regression because
the conditional mean and variance of the dependent variable are not
equal. To compute robust standard errors, the generalised linear
model variation of the negative binomial count data regression method
is applied.
In Table 4, the second column reports the estimates of themodel (2)
for the total sample when using the total number of cross-listings
(NLISTING). Columns three to eight estimate model (2) for FTSE350
and AIM companies separately, replacing NLISTING with SE, OTC and
ATS in succession. The total sample regression explains about 83% (ad-
justed R-squared) of the variance in the number of analysts following
a UK listed firm. These results are generally in line with prior empirical
results and expectations (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hussain, 2000; Marston,
1997) except for %INST, VOL and NLISTING. However, there are impor-
tant differences when we break down the results by listing location.
The association between analyst coverage (NANAL) and the percent-
age of institutional holdings (%INST) is negative and significant. This is
consistent with results from Marston (1997) but in contrast to results
from Bhushan (1989) and Hussain (2000). Later, we find evidence
that the negative sign is likely due to missing variable bias by failing
to control for listing requirements. Return variability (VOL) has a signif-
icant negative association with NANAL for the entire sample and for
both FTSE350 and AIM companies. If analyst information and public in-
formation are more useful in predicting future return than public infor-
mation alone, then higher return variability is expected to drive higher
trading profits. Thus, Bhushan (1989) expects that the aggregate de-
mand for analyst services is an increasing function of a firm's return var-
iability, assuming that the additional cost of information acquisition for
firmswith higher return variability is not significant. Our result, howev-
er, implies that either trading profits are lower or the cost of acquiring
information is higher, or both, for the UK listed companies with higher
volatility. This discourages analysts from covering more volatile stocks.
Our results also show that firm size measured by total assets (TA) has
a positive and significant impact on analyst coverage consistentwith re-
sults from prior studies (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2012, 2014).
Overall, cross-listing (NLISTING) is negative but the type of trading
venue seems to be the salient factor here. The number of listings onstock exchanges (SE) is positively associated with analyst coverage for
FTSE350 and AIM companies while the number of over the counter list-
ings is inversely related for AIM companies. The impact of listings on
stock exchanges (SE) is consistent with Marston (1997) but in contrast
with Eng et al. (2008). Evidently, cross-listing on stock exchanges (SE)
enhances analyst coverage likely because more investors trade on the
additional stock exchanges and demand more analyst services (Baker,
Nofsinger, &Weaver, 2002). In contrast, less transparentmarket venues
tend to be inversely associatedwith analysts coverage, possibly because
less transparent markets discourage active trading interest and lessen
the demand for analyst services. There is also evidence that the industry
sector affects the number of analysts following a UK listed company
where the energy sector attracts more analyst coverage, especially for
the junior market, whereas most other industry sectors attract fewer
analysts.
It is remarkable that listing on the main board (MRT) has a signifi-
cant positive influence on the number of analysts following a UK listed
company that is independent of other control variables. This result sug-
gests that one benefit of moving to themain board is thatmore analysts
are likely to follow the firm and potentially this can improve themarket
for the firm's shares and increase firm value. This implies that listing on
the main market increases the aggregate demand for analyst services
since companies listed on the main market have wider investors'
bases and are more in the public eye (visible) than their AIM counter-
parts. However, the significance ofMRT can be a result of listing require-
ments because firms listed on the main board have larger market
capitalisation and/or larger free float, two attributes that are
hypothesised to be positively associated with analyst coverage.4.5. An examination of listing requirements
To examine the impact of listing requirements on analyst coverage,
we first replace total assets (TA) with market capitalisation (MCAP)
and check the impact on the MRT dummy. Then we add FLOAT and
again check the impact on the MRT dummy. The purpose is to show
the association between the number of analysts following and each of
the two listing requirements, i.e. market capitalisation (MCAP) and
free float (FLOAT) for the total sample and for the individual markets
by type of cross-listing separately.
Table 5
Testing for firm size measured by market capitalisation (MCAP).
This table reports the impact of market capitalisation and other control factors on the number of analysts following firms (NANAL) in the UK FTSE350, AIM markets and both markets
combined using Negative Binomial Count (Quadratic hill climbing) and GLM Robust Standard Errors & Covariance.
Variable Expected sign Total all FTSE350 SE FTSE350 OTC FTSE350 ATS AIM SE AIM OTC AIM ATS
b0 −1.609** −0.461** −0.472** −0.533** −1.295** −1.037** −1.180**
Ln (1 + NINST) +/− 0.179** 0.442** 0.490** 0.487** 0.219** 0.226** 0.228**
Ln (1 + %INST) +/− 0.095** −0.073 −0.087** −0.087** −0.05 −0.078 −0.062
Ln (1 + %INSID) − 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.016 0.015 0.018
Ln (VOL) + 0.001 −0.031 −0.021 −0.018 −0.126** −0.126** −0.130**
Ln (1 + NSEG) − −0.083** −0.063** −0.047** −0.050** −0.146** −0.117** −0.116**
Ln(1 + NLISTING) +/− −0.052** 0.140** −0.028** 0.001 0.011 −0.103** −0.056**
BIG4 + 0.357** 0.271** 0.249** 0.251** 0.249** 0.266** 0.254**
BETA + 0.234** 0.246** 0.265** 0.261** 0.202** 0.205** 0.203**
ROE + 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
MRT + 0.764**
Ln (MCAP) + 0.246** 0.066** 0.075** 0.075** 0.394** 0.391** 0.394**
CONSUMER__CYCLICAL 0.110** 0.090** 0.098** 0.094** 0.051 0.011 0.032
CONSUMER__NON_CYCLICAL −0.105** −0.077** −0.056* −0.062** −0.132** −0.119** −0.130**
ENERGY 0.175** 0.068* 0.040 0.050 0.249** 0.243** 0.247**
FINANCIAL −0.160** −0.146** −0.137** −0.141** −0.414** −0.440** −0.424**
INDUSTRIAL −0.129** −0.144** −0.141** −0.148** −0.211** −0.224** −0.214**
TECHNOLOGY −0.073* 0.078* 0.060 0.067 −0.365** −0.362** −0.369**
UTILITIES −0.161** −0.131** −0.135** −0.134** −1.111 −1.032 −1.085
N 3197 1403 1403 1403 2082 2082 2082
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.55 0.56 0.55
Log likelihood −6831.9 −4139 −4157.3 −4159.2 −3056.1 −3043.3 −3053.6
**, *. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed) respectively. Ln: the natural logarithm.
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rather than the firm size LN (TA) variable. Table 5 is constructed the
same way as Table 4. The second column reports the estimates of
model (2) for the total sample when using the total number of cross-
listings (NLISTING). Columns three to eight estimate model (2) for
FTSE350 and AIM companies separately, replacing NLISTING with SE,
OTC and ATS in succession.
Table 5 shows that the association between NANAL and MCAP is
positive and significant for all the specifications of the three samples.
The introduction of MCAP has sizeably reduced the magnitude of MRT
from 0.893 to 0.764 but it is still significant suggesting that listing loca-
tion is still important even when we control for the larger market
capitalisation of main board listed companies. Also, the introduction of
MCAP has improved the log likelihood for all samples suggesting that
MCAP is a better proxy for firm size. Comparing these results with
those shown in Table 4, we find that firm size measured by total assets
or market capitalisation is significantly more important as a determi-
nate of analysts' coverage for the junior rather than main board compa-
nies (Z-test8). Taken these results together, we conclude that market
capitalisation, a parameter used by the exchange to help determine
the listing location, is an especially important driver for analyst cover-
age that itself does not explain the additional coverage provided to
main board firms.
Table 5 also reports that the association between analyst coverage
(NANAL) and the percentage of institutional holdings (%INST) is now
positive and significant. As the only difference between Tables 4 and 5
is the change in specification of the size variable from assets LN (TA)
to the listing relevant market capitalisation MCAP proxy, this change8 We conduct a Z-test to determine if the LN (TA) in Table 3 and the MCAP in Table 4 is
significantly larger for AIM rather than FTSE350 listed stocks finding that both size proxies
are significantly larger at the 5% level for AIM companies. The Z statistics is calculated as
follows: Z = (b1− b2) / SQR (SEb12 + SEb22): where b1 and b2 are the coefficients of the
slopes of the relevant variables. SEb1 and SEb2 are the standard errors for b1 and b2 respec-
tively, and SQR is the square root.We omit the details of this test for the sake of brevity but
the results of a similar Z-test are reported in Table 6 that reach the same conclusions
concerning the difference in determinates of analysts following for FTSE350 as opposed
to AIM listed stocks. Details of the omitted Tables 4 and 5 tests are available from the cor-
responding author upon request.in sign is likely due to the more discriminatory MCAP variable that pro-
vides a better fitting model.9
Table 6 next reports the joint influence of MCAP and FLOAT on
the number of analysts following a UK listed company. In contrast to
Tables 4 and 5, we now utilise the log of the number of listings on
stock exchange (SE) as a proxy for cross-listing to make our results
more comparable to the existing literature that, evidently, examined
the influence of cross-listing on stock exchanges only. In results not re-
ported here, we reach the same conclusions obtained in Table 6 when
we use alternative specifications of the number of listings (i.e., OTC
and ATS).10
In Table 6, MCAP has a positive association with the number of
analysts following for all samples and FLOAT has a positive associa-
tion with NANAL for the total sample and for AIM listed companies.
However, FLOAT has an inverse association with NANAL for
FTSE350 companies. The Z-test shows that both MCAP and FLOAT
havemuch higher importance for AIM companies. Comparing the re-
sults in Table 6 with those obtained in Table 5, we can see that in-
cluding FLOAT has a marginal impact on the log likelihood of the
model. Again %INST is positive suggesting that, after controlling for
listing requirements, acquiring analyst services is not cost effective
for individual investors, so more concentrated institutional owner-
ship increases the demand for analyst services. The great point is,
however, that even when we control for the listing requirements,
MRT is still positive and highly significant indicating that listing loca-
tion really does matter because even when we control for listing re-
quirements, more analysts follow main board FTSE350 companies
than their junior market AIM counterparts.
Clearly, the demand for financial analysts is different for AIM and
FTSE350 listed stocks where a larger free float attracts additional ana-
lysts following for AIM companies but it has an inverse impact on ana-
lysts following FTSE350 companies. One possible reason can be that
with a larger float, there is a greater need for monitoring. Table 2B9 There are some other minor differences, for example ROE is no longer significant for
the overall sample, but it is true that other than %INST, no coefficient that was significant
in Table 4 became significant of the opposite sign in Table 5.
10 Specifically, analyst coverage increases in stock exchanges listings for the main board
stocks and decreases in over the counter market and alternative trading systems for the
junior market shares.
11 Also, industry effects tend to be more significant for the AIM market.
Table 6
Testing for MCAP and free float.
This table reports the impact ofmarket capitalisation and freefloat aswell as other control factors on the number of analysts following firms (NANAL) in theUK FTSE350, AIMmarkets and
both markets combined using Negative Binomial Count (Quadratic hill climbing) and GLM Robust Standard Errors & Covariance.
Variable Expected sign Total FTSE350 AIM Z-TEST
b0 −2.107** −0.115 −2.121** 4.566+
Ln (1 + NINST) +/− 0.143** 0.468** 0.188** 5.253+
Ln (1 + %INST) +/− 0.113** −0.057 −0.032 −0.355
Ln (1 + %INSID) − 0.011 −0.002 0.035** −1.839+
Ln (VOL) + 0.007 −0.048* −0.120** 1.450
Ln (1 + NSEG) − −0.100** −0.065** −0.153** 1.739+
Ln (1 + SE) +/− 0.075** 0.146** −0.007 2.995+
BIG4 + 0.356** 0.272** 0.251** 0.287
BETA + 0.216** 0.250** 0.176** 1.089
ROE + 0.000 0.000 0.002** −2.607+
MKT + 0.764**
Ln(MCAP) + 0.243** 0.054** 0.397** −15.654+
Ln (FLOAT) + 0.079** −0.096** 0.205** −4.703+
CONSUMER__CYCLICAL 0.102** 0.092** 0.040 0.620
CONSUMER__NON_CYCLICAL −0.127** −0.073** −0.145** 1.071
ENERGY 0.176** 0.076* 0.240** −2.303+
FINANCIAL −0.166** −0.144** −0.412** 3.205+
INDUSTRIAL −0.144** −0.136** −0.245** 1.413
TECHNOLOGY −0.072* 0.089** −0.408** 5.452+
UTILITIES −0.164** −0.131** −1.047 1.263
N 3197 1403 2082
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.67 0.56
Log likelihood −6831.75 −4135.23 −3048.54
**, *. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 and0.05 level (2-tailed) respectively. Ln: thenatural logarithm;+ the difference is significant at the 0.05 level (right tail)where the critical value of Z
is 1.64; Z is calculated as follows: Z= (b1− b2) / SQR (SEb12+ SEb22): where b1 and b2 are the coefficients of the slopes of the relevant variables. SEb1 and SEb2 are the standard errors for b1
andb2 respectively, and SQR is the square root. This testswhether the relevant coefficient is significantly different between themain board FTSE350 and their juniormarket AIM counterpart.
235O.A.G. Hassan, F.S. Skinner / International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016) 227–236shows that institutional ownership is more dominant for FTSE350
companies. Given the dominance of institutions, internal monitoring
can be more effective for main board companies. This can act as a substi-
tute for external analysts, thereby reducing the number of analysts
following. However, for AIM listed companies, institutions are less
dominant. Moreover, a larger free float implies that the company can up-
grade to themain board, thereby attracting additional analysts following.
It is alsoworth noting that there are clearly different industry effects
for the main board and junior markets. It is striking that well-
established technology firms attract additional analysts following for
the main board but attract fewer analysts for recent technology firms
listed on the junior market. It is also noteworthy that energy firms are
always popular with analysts, but only established consumer cyclical
firms listed on themain board have a positive associationwith the num-
ber of analysts following.
To summarise, we discover that parameters that are used by the
London Stock Exchange to determine the listing location, specifically
market capitalisation and free float, influence analyst coverage. More-
over, market capitalisation and free float have more powerful impacts
on analyst coverage for AIM companies than on their FTSE350 counter-
parts. Nevertheless, even when we include the impact of these listing
parameters in our model, firms that are listed on the main board still
have significantly higher analyst coverage.
These conclusions raise the possibility that the demand and supply
functions for analyst services are not the same for the main board and
AIM stocks. A close observation of ourmost completemodel as reported
in Table 6, shows that even when we control for listing requirements,
many variables have different associations with NANAL depending on
the listing location. The number of cross-listings on SE is positive for
FTSE350 companies yet it is not significant for the AIM companies and
the Z-test shows that this difference is highly significant. The positive
association between analyst coverage and the number of institutional
investors NINST is significantly more important for main board listed
firms while the percentage of insiders' holdings (%INSID) is only signif-
icant for junior market firms. Moreover, the positive influence of profit-
ability (ROE) and the negative influence of the number of lines ofbusiness (NSEG) on analyst coverage are significantly higher for AIM
companies than their main board counterparts.11
Overall, these results suggest important differences between the
main board and junior market for the factors that determine the num-
ber of analysts following a firm. This implies that the listing dummy
could be concealing the differences in the supply and demand functions
for themain board and juniormarkets. Therefore,we should be cautious
when pooling observations from these two markets because this can
mask individual market differences and yield misleading results.5. Concluding remarks
We conclude that listing location really does matter. Firms listed on
the main board attract additional analyst coverage even when we con-
trol for the influence of different types of cross-listings and for listing re-
quirements. However, we do find evidence that the demand and supply
functions for analyst coverage do differ by the listing location, so that
pooling stocks from themain board and junior markets can lead tomis-
leading inferences concerning the determinants of analyst coverage.
In detail, the initial results show that the main factors that drive the
number of analysts following a firm in the UKmarket are broadly simi-
lar to other studies in the area, specifically ownership structure, return
variability, firm size, cross-listing, audit firm size, systematic risk, and
return on equity. In contrast to prior studies, we examine the determi-
nates of analysts following by listing location and find that listing on
the main board as opposed to the junior market has a significant posi-
tive impact on the number of analysts following that is independent of
other control variables. This suggests that one benefit of moving from
the junior AIM market to the main FTSE350 market is that the firm
can attract more analyst coverage. Potentially, this can improve the
market for the firm's shares and increase firm value.
We also examine whether listing requirements have influences on
analyst coverage and can explain the significant listing location
236 O.A.G. Hassan, F.S. Skinner / International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016) 227–236dummy variable. Specifically, we repeat the analysis by including mar-
ket capitalisation and free float. We find that market capitalisation and
free float have positive and significant associations with analyst cover-
age for the total sample. We also find that the impacts of both market
capitalisation and free float are significantly higher for the AIM listed
companies.
Still, even when we control for listing requirements, listing on the
main board attracts significantly more analysts following. When exam-
ining the results by the listing location, we find that some of the deter-
minants of analyst coverage are conditional on the listing location. For
example, additional listings on stock exchanges increase analyst cover-
age for the main board stocks but not the junior market stocks, yet ad-
ditional listings on less transparent over the counter and alternative
trading systems decrease analyst coverage for the junior market shares
but have less effect on themain board stocks. There are other examples.
Increases in the number of institutions owing shares increase analyst
coverage significantly more for the main board stocks while increases
in the percentage ownership by insiders and increases in profitability
increase analyst coverage significantly more for the junior market
stocks. Therefore, pooling stocks from these different listing locations
can mask individual differences between the main market and the
junior market and can yield misleading inferences about determinants
of analyst coverage by listing location.
Our results are of interest to investors and managers alike in that
they improve our understanding of the factors that attract analyst
coverage and how they are sensitive to listing location. Our results
also show specific characteristics of companies, depending on the listing
location, thatmanagement can control to attractmore analyst coverage.
Future research may investigate whether the attributes of analyst fore-
casts are also conditional on listing location.
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